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a b s t r a c t
Could the policy to promote overseas migrant work be to blame for the sluggish development in some
South Asian countries? I employ a macro-dynamic model of two small open economies to examine the
policy of the developing, labor-exporting country to promote migrant work in a rich, labor-importing
economy. The results from calibration exercises show that remittances received from migrant workers
are expansionary through its collateral impact. However, the loss of labor due to the policy hinders
capital accumulation in the poor country; as a result, it reduces income in the long run. Welfare,
however, increases due to the increase in consumption stimulated by the increase in remittances. The
impacts are more pronounced for a poorer country such as Nepal whose remittance receipts amounted
to more than 30 percent of GDP.
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
In an era of industrialization, Lewis (1954) argues that new
industries can be created and old industries expanded without
any shortage of labor in countries with abundant cheap labor
that moved from agriculture into manufacturing. However, since
the 1970s many South Asian countries including Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have put in many efforts
to promote overseas migrant work. This policy was triggered by
significant labor demand in the Middle East and foreign currency earnings as migrant workers send remittances back to
their families at home (Lim and Basnet, 2017). According to the
World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Data, by 2017 India had
over 16 million of its citizens working outside of India, followed
by Bangladesh and Pakistan, which exported 7.7 million and 6
million migrants, respectively. Nepal and Sri Lanka each had over
1.7 million of its citizens working abroad. These workers also sent
in billions of dollars annually back home. For example, the flow
of remittances in Nepal amounted to more than 30% of its GDP in
2016. However, according to the latest 2019–2020 classification
by the World Bank, Nepal is still in a low-income group with
income less than $1,025; Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are still
in lower-middle-income group; and Sri Lanka has just graduated
into the upper-middle-income group.
✩ I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for very helpful critical comments and suggestions. I also thank Eric Young for useful comments on the
earlier draft of the paper. I also benefited from discussions with Thomas Zlatoper
and Feng Zhan during the presentation at the Mellen Research Seminar Series
at John Carroll University. All remaining errors are mine.
E-mail address: slim@jcu.edu.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.004
0165-4896/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

In views of Lewis’s (1954) argument, could the policy to promote overseas migration be to blame for the sluggish development in these poor Asian countries? In this paper, I employ a
macro-dynamic model of two small open economies – a rich,
labor-importing country and a developing, labor-exporting country – to examine the macroeconomic impacts of this policy.
The model employed in this study combines the model used
in Lim and Morshed (2017) and that used in Chatterjee and
Turnovsky (2018). I extend the model used in Lim and Morshed (2017) by introducing Chatterjee and Turnovsky’s (2018)
collateral effect of remittances in the borrowing constraint of the
labor-exporting country. I also relax the assumption of inelastic
supply of capital in the rich country by allowing capital to be converted from the traded goods with an adjustment cost. Different
from Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2018), the model captures endogenous remittances that are linked to the household’s decision
to migrate.1
Here I briefly describe the analytical framework. The focus
should be on the developing country while the rich country is
included mainly to capture the endogenous flow of migrant labor
and remittances. Thus, there is an abstract in the structure of
the rich country. The rich country is assumed to be a small
open economy, so that it faces the world interest rate which
is exogenously determined outside the model. The assumption
of this rich, small open economy is, in fact, consistent with a
sample of Middle Eastern countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
1 Naval (2019) and Shen et al. (2010) also allow for endogenous migration
and remittances in a migration model to examine the relationship between
migration and inequality.
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The paper contributes to the literature in two important ways.
First, the paper provides a theoretical implication for the policy
of many poor countries to promote overseas migrant work for
its citizens, which has not been studied before. Second, the paper
extends the macro-dynamic model in the literature by combining
two features – the endogenous migration and the collateral effect
of remittances. The extension allows us to evaluate two opposing
impacts – the gain from remittances vs the loss of labor due to
migration – on the labor-exporting country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides some background information. Section 3 details the
analytical model. Section 4 derives the macroeconomic equilibrium. Section 5 presents and discusses the numerical calibration
exercises including the exercise for Nepal, a country that receives
a large share of remittances. Section 6 provides some robustness
tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes the findings.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, which employ
significant amount of migrant labor in their economies. In the rich
economy, households consume a traded good and leisure. The
production of the traded good uses private capital, native labor,
and migrant workers. Private capital can be converted from the
traded good with an adjustment cost. The households in the rich
country decide only between leisure and working in the domestic
production. Thus, no labor migrates from the rich country to
work in the developing country. In contrast, households in the
developing country decide on the allocation of time between (i)
leisure, (ii) domestic manufacturing production, (iii) and migrant
work. Migrant workers earn a migrant wage and remit a portion
of their earning after consuming in the rich country. This gives
rise to an endogenous flow of remittances that is associated with
migration, in line with the findings of Lim and Morshed (2015).
Labor in both countries including migrant workers is paid with
its respective marginal product.
Households in both countries are assumed to have access to
the international financial market, but they are constrained by the
upward-sloping supply curve of debt. That is, they are charged
an interest rate that includes a borrowing premium above the
given world interest rate. The borrowing premium – a proxy for
the country’s risk – reflects the country repayment capacity and
comprises the current level of debt relative to the size of its
GDP. For the developing country, the risk premium also captures
the country’s remittances as foreign currency earnings in the
repayment capacity. Thus, a larger remittance inflow raises its
foreign reserves and repayment capacity, thus reducing the risk
premium. I assume that migration incurs a cost due to frictions
that result from tightened immigration laws or stricter control
over hiring migrant workers. This friction parameter also serves
as the policy to promote migration of the poor country. For
example, this friction can be reduced when the government of the
poor country puts forward efforts to establish a formal process to
find jobs for migrant labor. This policy is discussed in details in
the next section.
The model is then calibrated to yield a long-run equilibrium
consistent with the data for samples of Middle Eastern, laborimporting countries and South Asian, labor-exporting countries.
In the calibration exercises, I show that remittances are expansionary for the labor-exporting, developing economy through its
collateral impact. However, the policy to promote overseas migrant work is contractionary because the negative income effect
due to labor migration significantly outweighs the expansionary
effect from the remittance inflow. The loss of labor due to the
policy hinders domestic capital accumulation, costing its long-run
economic development. However, the welfare increases due to
rising consumption as a result of increased remittance receipts.
Additional results from applying the model to the case of Nepal
show that the macroeconomic impacts of the policy to promote
overseas migration are more pronounced for a poorer country
although it receives a substantial share of remittances to its GDP.
The collateral impact of remittances is also larger for a large share
of remittances. However, with a large elasticity of wage at a lower
level of income, Nepal also suffers a great loss of output due to
migration.2

2. Background
Since 1970, many South Asian countries including Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have put in many efforts to
promote overseas migrant work. These efforts are in large part
driven by the increase in labor demand in the Middle East. Formal
institutions have been established to formalize and govern the
migration processes. In 1971, the Pakistani government created
the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment to promote
overseas employment. India enacted the Emigration Act in 1983,
and later established the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, to
centralize all processes related to the Indian migrant workers.
In 1984, the Bangladeshi government formed the Bangladesh
Overseas Employment and Services Limited for the export of
Bangladeshi workers. Nepal approved the Foreign Employment
Act in 1985, which led to the establishment of the Department of
Foreign Employment. Sri Lanka established the Sri Lanka Bureau
of Foreign Employment under legislation approved in 1985.
These institutions are established to promote overseas migrant
work for their citizens by setting up and governing a formal
procedure for the migrant employment markets. The governance
involves a variety of roles including as a regulator and a policy
maker. As a regulator, they license and supervise the overseas
employment agencies which operate as recruiters, advertising the
available jobs, recruiting migrant workers, training them, acquiring necessary documents including passports and visas, and so on.
The institutions also ensure that the employment activities are in
compliance with the labor law. As a policy maker, the institutions
get involved in the cooperation between the labor-exporting and
labor-importing countries. In some cases, they may also represent their government as a signatory in the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on the migrant labor agreement.
The efforts have led to significant surge in migrant workers
seeking jobs overseas and remittances that they send back home.
Fig. 1 illustrates the trends of the share of migrant workers
and the remittance–GDP ratio in each of the five South Asian
countries. The share of migrant workers is the number of migrant workers (excluding those migrating within the region) as
a percentage of the labor-exporting country’s population and
remittance–GDP ratios are averaged over each decade to smooth
out any short-run fluctuations. The reason that migrant workers
within the region are excluded is that traditionally there was
migration within these South Asian countries even before the

2 Human capital is not modeled in this study. There are two channels that
international migration can have a positive effect on human capital of the
labor-exporting countries: a direct remittance effect and an effect of skilled
migration prospects. While there is micro evidence that remittance-receiving
families spend more on education of their kids (Yang, 2008), there is no evidence
that remittances increase the level of education at the macro level (see Beine
et al., 2008; Lim and Simmons, 2016). Beine et al. (2008) also show that there is
a possible brain gain for countries with small skilled migration rates as the effect
of skilled migration incentive dominates that of actual skilled emigration. In the
1990 data, they find that the gain in terms of proportion of skilled population

is relatively small for South Asian countries, 0.3% for India, 0.2% for Bangladesh,
0.1% for Nepal and barely 0% for Pakistan while for Sri Lanka the proportion
of skilled population dropped by 0.6% due to skilled emigration. Given a large
increase in migration in these countries in recent years due to the policy to
promote labor migration, the gains for these countries may be smaller or even
disappear. Nonetheless, this issue deserves a more careful investigation.
114
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Fig. 1. Migration and remittances in South Asian countries. Notes: Share of migrant workers (excluding migrant workers within the region) is the percentage of the
population of its respective country. Remittance–GDP ratio is the annual average share within the respective decade. The data for Nepal’s remittances in 1980s are
missing and those for Pakistan’s are not included as they could be manipulated by huge Pakistani migrants within the region as discussed in the text.
Source: Author’s calculations of data from World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Data and World Development Indicators.

policy was in place. For instance, there were more than 8 million
Pakistani migrants in India between 1960 and 1970 and then the
number dropped to nearly 2 million in 1990, and to just above
1 million between 2000 and 2010 (World Bank’s Migration and
Remittances Database, 2020).
According to Fig. 1, the share of migrant workers from each
of these South Asian countries has been on the rise, indicating
that the growth of migrant workers is higher than that of its
population. By 2017, India had about 1.09% of its 1.3 billion people
working as migrant workers outside the region; Bangladesh had
2.8% of its 159 million people as migrant workers; Pakistan had
2.4% of its 207 million people while the small countries like
Nepal and Sri Lanka had the largest share, 5.17% of its 27 million
people and 7.34% of its 21 million people, respectively, as migrant
workers. These increased outflows of migrant workers also coincided with the rising inflows of remittances. Between 2010 and
2019, the average share of remittances (as percentage of GDP)
reached 3.2% in India from about 1% in 1980s, 7.8% in Bangladesh
from 2.6% in 1980s, 6.6% in Pakistan from 2.9% in 1990s, 27% in

Nepal from 1.3% in 1990s, and 8.3% in Sri Lanka from 5.1% in
1980s.
3. Model
I set up a simple macro-dynamic model of two small open
economies consisting of a rich, labor-importing country and a
developing, labor-exporting country. Both economies produce the
same traded good and are small in that they take the price of
the traded good as given. Both economies also have access to the
world financial market, but are subject of a borrowing premium,
which reflects their associated risk. The world interest rate is
exogenously determined outside the model. The two countries
are described as follows.
3.1. Rich, labor-importing country
Firms in the rich country use capital (Kh ), native labor (Nh )
and migrant workers (Nm ) to produce traded output (Yh ). The
115
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nation’s aggregate debt (Bh ), relative to its ability to service the
debt, as reflected by GDP, Yh . The cost of borrowing is thus
specified by3

country’s production technology is given by the neoclassical
function
Yh = f (Kh , Nh , Nm )

(1)

rh = r ∗ + ω

where fKh > 0, fNh > 0, fNm > 0, fKh Kh < 0, fNh Nh < 0, fNm Nm <
0, fKh Nh > 0, fKh Nm > 0 and fNh Nm > 0. So, all three productive
factors, and more specifically, native and migrant workers, are
complements in production. The assumption of
)
( complementarity
of migrant and native workers in production fNh Nm > 0 implies
that the inflow of migrant workers will raise the marginal product
of native workers and thus, their wage rate (given stock of
physical capital).
The profit maximizing behavior of firms yields the conventional demand functions for capital, native labor and migrant
workers as follows
rKh = pfKh (Kh , Nh , Nm )

(2)

wh = pfNh (Kh , Nh , Nm )

(3)

wm = pfNm (Kh , Nh , Nm )

(4)

2Kh

(11)
and the optimality conditions are given by
(12)

HLh (Ch , Lh ) = πwh

(13)

qh − 1 = h
q̇h
qh

+

1
qh

(14)

Ih

(15)

Kh

[
rKh +

]
(qh − 1)2
2h

= rh

(16)

where π and qh are the shadow prices of wealth and private capital, each of which is relative to that of foreign bonds, respectively.
Eq. (12) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the
shadow price of wealth. Eq. (13) is the native labor supply equation which implies that the marginal utility of leisure is equal
to the utility-adjusted return to labor. Eq. (14) is the Keynes–
Ramsey consumption rule which equates the rate of return on
consumption to the borrowing cost. Eq. (15) is the optimum
decision for private investment while Eq. (16) is the no-arbitrage
condition for private investment, equating the return on physical
capital to the cost of borrowing.
The transversality conditions require that

(5)

lim πh Kh e−β t = 0; lim π Bh e−β t = 0

t →∞

t →∞

(17)

where πh = qh π is the shadow price of private capital stock.
Finally, I assume a very simple form of government budget
in the rich economy. This government balances the budget at all
times by spending all the tax revenue. Thus,

(7)

Gh = Th

(18)

(8)
3.2. Developing, labor-exporting country

0

where β is the rate of time preference, subject to their accumulation of foreign debt
Ḃh = rh Bh + Ch + Th + Φh (Ih , Kh ) − rKh Kh − wh Nh

HCh (Ch , Lh ) = π

π̇
β − = rh
π

∞

H (Ch , Lh ) e−β t dt

)

2Kh

Households in the rich economy obtain utility from consumption (Ch ) and leisure (Lh ) which follows the concave utility function
Wh =

(10)

(
)
hI 2
− π e−β t rh Bh + Ch + Th + Ih + h − rKh Kh − wh Nh − Ḃh

Each household in the rich country is endowed with one unit
of time and allocates it between leisure (Lh ) and work (Nh ). Native
labor supply is subject to the constraint

∫

′′

ω ′ > 0, ω > 0

;

Yh

(

(6)

Nh = 1 − Lh

)

HR ≡ HCh (Ch , Lh ) e−β t + π ′ e−β t (1 − Lh − Nh ) + qh e−β t Ih − K̇h

where h is the unit-free cost parameter. The specification follows Hayashi (1982). Without the depreciation cost, the capital
accumulation can be written as
K̇h = Ih

Bh

where r ∗ is the exogenous real world interest rate, and ω (Bh /Yh )
is the borrowing premium. In the decision process, the household,
in a decentralized economy, takes the borrowing cost as given.
This is because it is a function of the economy’s aggregate debt
to output ratio which in a small open economy an individual
household is too small to influence.
The households in the rich economy maximize (8) by choosing
consumption Ch , leisure Lh , investment Ih , capital stock Kh , and
debt Bh , subject to (6), (7) and (9). The Hamiltonian equation can
be written as

where rKh , wh and wm are the return on capital, the wage rate
for natives and the wage rate for migrant workers, respectively.
p is the output price in the rich country. Both countries take this
price as given since they are too small to influence it. Eq. (2) is
the rich country’s demand for capital which equates the marginal
product of capital to the return on capital; Equation (3) is the rich
country’s demand for native labor which equates their marginal
product to the natives’ wage rate while Equation (4) is the rich
country’s demand for migrant workers which equates migrants’
marginal product to the migrants’ wage rate. Furthermore, if
natives are more productive than migrant workers then wh > wm ,
and vice versa.
The households in this economy invest domestically an
amount Ih ; however, converting traded goods into domestic investment incurs an adjustment cost. The gross investment cost
can be expressed

(
)
hIh
Φh (Ih , Kh ) = Ih 1 +

(

Firms in the developing country use its own labor and capital to produce a traded (manufacturing) good. The neoclassical
production function is of the form

(9)

where rh denotes unit borrowing costs, and Bh is the rich country’s stock of debt. Th is the lump-sum tax imposed by the government of the rich economy.
The household in the rich economy has access to the international financial markets; however, they are subject to a borrowing
premium, which reflects their associated risk. This borrowing
premium is assumed to be strictly increasing and convex in the

Yd = F (Kd , Nd )

(19)

3 Foreign borrowing constraint of Eq. (10) has long been used in macrodynamic models and forms a convenient way of closing the ‘‘small economy
model’’; see Turnovsky (1997). Empirical evidence supporting functions of this
form is provided by Edwards (1984) and more recently by Chung and Turnovsky
(2010).
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where 0 < 1 − ξ < 1 is the cost associated with migration.
This cost includes expenses such as job search, work permits and
transportation. This cost could be high for an informal migrant
labor market where migrant workers must go through many
hurdles including time spent on the immigration process of the
host country to obtain the work visa/permit. While migrant workers are paid with their marginal product, the loss of migrant
income due to the friction is treated as a deadweight loss which
disappears from the model. In this paper, I use ξ as the policy
variable. In an effort to promote overseas migrant work, the South
Asian governments have formalized the migrant labor market
by establishing institutions within the administrations to help
facilitate and govern the process. I assume that this formalization
leads to a lower migration cost; thus, the policy to promote labor
migration is associated with ξ → 1.
The representative household derives utility from domestic
consumption, migrant consumption abroad and leisure. The utility function is

where Yd is the economy’s traded output. Nd is labor employed
in the traded sector. I assume that FKd > 0, FKd Kd < 0, FNd > 0
and FNd Nd < 0. The profit-maximization behavior of firms in
the developing country yields the following demand functions for
labor and physical capital
FNd (Kd , Nd ) = wd

(20)

FKd (Kd , Nd ) = rKd

(21)

where rKd and wd are the real return on physical capital and the
real wage rate, respectively. By appropriate choice of units, the
price level in this economy is assumed to be unity.
The households in this economy invest domestically an
amount, Id ; however, converting traded goods into investment
incurs an adjustment cost. The gross investment cost is expressed
as

η Id

(

Φd (Id , Kd ) = Id 1 +

)
(22)

2Kd

K̇d = Id

where UCd > 0, ULd > 0, UCd Cd < 0, and ULd Ld < 0. M (Cm ) is the
utility of migrants from consuming while working abroad, with
MCm > 0 and MCm Cm < 0. For simplicity, M (Cm ) is assumed to be
additively separable from U (Cd , Ld ).
The households in the developing country maximize (28) by
choosing domestic consumption Cd , migrant consumption Cm ,
leisure Ld , migrant workers Nm , investment Id , capital stock Kd ,
and debt Bd , subject to (23), (24) and (26). The Hamiltonian
equation can be written as

(24)

I assume that like the rich country, the household in the
developing country also has access to the world financial market.
The household faces an upward-sloping supply curve for debt. As
noted in Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2018), remittances have become important for some developing countries, especially those
with high remittance-to-GDP ratio, to use as collateral in securing
borrowing. Thus, I explicitly allow for possible portion, κ , where
0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, of the flow of remittances to serve as a component of
repayment capacity. Thus, the interest rate function is specified
as
r =r +Ω

(

Bd
Yd + κ R

)
;

′′

Ω > 0, Ω > 0
′

HD ≡ [U (Cd , Ld ) + M (Cm )] e−β t + λ′ e−β t (1 − Ld − Nd − Nm )

(
)
+ qd e−β t Id − K̇d
[
ηI 2
− λe−β t rBd + Cd + Cm + Td + +Id + d
2Kd
]
− (1 − τ ) rKd Kd − wd Nd − ξ wm Nm − Ḃd

(29)

and the optimality conditions are given by

(25)

where Bd is the country’s stock of debt; r is the interest rate
faced by the household in the developing country; and Ω (Bd /(Yd
+κ R)) is the borrowing premium. Similar to the rich economy,
the assumption of small open economy implies that individual
household cannot influence the interest rate and so takes it as
given.
The developing economy household’s instantaneous budget
constraint can be written as

UCd (Cd , Ld ) = λ

(30)

MCm (Cm ) = λ

(31)

ULd (Cd , Ld ) = λwd = λξ wm

(32)

λ̇
β− =r
λ

(33)

qd − 1 = η
q̇d
qd

Ḃd = rBd +Cd +Cm +Td +Φd (Id , Kd )−(1 − τ ) rKd Kd −wd Nd −ξ wm Nm

+

1
qd

[

Id

(34)

Kd

(1 − τ ) rKd +

(qd − 1)2
2η

]
=r

(35)

where λ is the shadow price of wealth in the form of foreign
bonds. qd denotes the shadow price of private capital relative to
that of foreign bonds.
Eqs. (30) and (31) equate the marginal utility of domestic
consumption and that of migrant consumption, respectively, to
the shadow price of wealth. Eq. (32) is the labor supply equations for all labor markets including the domestic traded good
production and the migrant labor market. That is, the marginal
utility of leisure is equal to the utility-adjusted return to work in
each of the labor markets. This means that any changes in either
of the wage incomes will affect the amount of leisure, as well
as consumption of final goods. Eq. (33) is the Keynes–Ramsey
consumption rule which equates the return on consumption to
the cost of borrowing, given by (25). Eq. (34) is the optimum
decision for private investment while Eq. (35) is the no-arbitrage

(26)
where Cd is the consumption of the representative household
(located in the developing country) and Cm is the consumption
of migrant workers chosen by the household in this economy. Td
represents the lump-sum tax. τ is the tax rate imposed on private
capital income.
Migrant workers remit a fraction of income after consumption
(Cm ) back to their family in the home country. This specification
draws upon the empirical work of Lim and Morshed (2015) who
empirically show that the increased remittances to developing
countries is the result of migration triggered by income shocks.
The equation for remittances (R) can be written as
R = ξ wm Nm − Cm

(28)

0

Each household is endowed with one unit of time and allocates
it among traded production (Nd ), migrant work abroad (Nm ) and
leisure (Ld ). The labor market constraint is then expressed as

∗

[U (Cd , Ld ) + M (Cm )] e−β t dt

Wd =

(23)

Nd + Nm + Ld = 1

∞

∫

where η is the unit-free cost parameter. Without the depreciation
cost, the capital accumulation can be written as

(27)
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condition for private investment, equating the return on physical
capital to the cost of borrowing.
In addition, the transversality conditions require
lim λd Kd e−β t = 0;

t →∞

lim λBd e−β t = 0

t →∞

(36)

K̇d =

where λd = qd λ is the shadow price of private capital stock.
Finally, the government of the developing country collects its
revenue from a tax on capital income and a lump-sum tax, Td ,
from the domestic household. The total tax revenue is used for
public consumption, Gd . For simplicity, it is assumed that public
consumption yields no utility. Following Baxter and King (1993),
I assume that the government uses lump-sum tax, Td , to maintain
a balanced budget at all points of time. The government budget
constraint is

τ rKd Kd + Td = Gd

where Gd = gYd . That is, the government of the developing
country sets its expenditure policy so as to claim a fixed share,
g, of GDP, where 0 < g < 1. Thus, the size of the government
increases with the size of the economy.

(39)

I can derive the equilibrium consumption (Cd ) and labor supplies
in the two labor markets (Nd and Nm ) from Eqs. (20), (24), (30)
and (32) as
Cd = Cd (λ, Kh , Kd , Nh ; p)

(40)

Nd = Nd (λ, Kh , Kd , Nh ; p)

(41)

Nm = Nm (λ, Kh , Kd , Nh ; p)

(42)

π̇ = π (β − rh )

(45)

)
Kh ( 2
Ḃh = rh Bh + Ch +
qh − 1 + Gh − pfKh Kh − pfNh Nh
2h
[
]
(qh − 1)2
q̇h = rh qh − pfKh +
2h

H (Ch , Lh ) =

(43)

(44)

(50)

The dynamic system comprises highly non-linear equations.
Also, because of the high dimensionality of the system, further
insights can be obtained by calibrating the model to reflect the
real-world data. The calibration exercises are performed to illustrate the theoretical mechanism and the analyses are done to fit
the real data as much as possible. The results would depend on
the chosen values of parameters; therefore, the robustness tests
are presented in the next section. The following functional forms
are used.
The rich, labor-importing country’s utility function is of the
form

Using Eqs. (38)–(42), I can derive Ch , Nh , Cd , Nd , and Nm as a
function of π , λ, Kh and Kd . This suggests that once I determine
the time paths of both capital stocks (Kd , Kh ), the shadow price
of wealth of the developing economy (λ), and that of the rich
economy (π ), I can derive the time paths of both consumption
quantities (Cd , Ch ) and labor supplies (Nd , Nm , Nh ). These time
paths of Kd , Kh , λ and π , together with qd , qh , Bd and Bh can
be determined from the following equilibrium dynamics of the
model

)
Kd ( 2
qd − 1
Ḃd = rBd + Cd + Cm +
2η
− (1 − g ) F (Kd , Nd ) − ξ pfNm Nm

(qd − 1)

5. Numerical analysis

4.1. Equilibrium dynamics

λ̇ = λ (β − r )

η

In the long run, the model economies progress to a steadystate position in which λ̇ = Ḃd = π̇ = Ḃh = q̇h = K̇h = q̇d =
K̇d = 0 and along with Eqs. (31) and (38)–(42), I can solve for the
steady-state values of λ̃, B̃d , π̃, B̃h , q̃h , K̃h , q̃d , K̃d , C̃d , C̃m , Ñd , Ñm ,
C̃h and Ñh where the ‘‘∼’’ denotes a steady-state value for an
endogenous variable. The steady-state equilibrium can be summarized by the set of relationship, applicable to the rich and
developing countries, respectively. See the set of steady-state
equations in Appendix B. There are thirteen equations that determine the long-run equilibrium. They indicate some interdependence between the two economies. The economy of the
labor-importing country can be affected by any changes in the
labor-exporting country that impact migrant workers. The economy of the labor-exporting country can also be affected by any
changes that impact the remittances it receives from the laborimporting countries. The numerical simulations will demonstrate
these cases with the policy of the labor-exporting country to
promote overseas migrant work for its workers.

In this section, I combine the two economies to derive their
macroeconomic equilibrium. The important feature is that labor
migration links the two economies, so that the economic performance in the developing country depends on not just the physical
capital at home, but also capital stock and labor employed in the
rich country.
Using (3) and (7), the rich economy’s consumption (Ch ) and
native labor supply (Nh ) can be derived from (12) and (13) as
Nh = Nh (π , Kh , Nm ; p)

Kd

(49)

4.2. Steady state

4. Macroeconomic equilibrium

(38)

(48)

h

where Eqs. (44) and (46) describe the evolutions of debt for the
developing and rich economies, respectively. rh and r are given
by Eqs. (10) and (25), respectively.
The equilibrium is characterized by an autonomous system of
eight differential equations. The rich country’s capital stock (Kh ),
the capital stock of the developing country (Kd ), the rich country’s
foreign debt (Bh ), and the debt of the developing country (Bd )
are assumed to move sluggishly, while the shadow prices of
wealth, λ and π , and the capital prices, qd and qh , are free to
jump instantaneously. In Appendix A, I show how to solve for the
linearized stable solutions for Kd , Kh , λ, π , qd , qh , Bd and Bh to the
equilibrium dynamics of the model.

(37)

Ch = Ch (π , Kh , Nm ; p)

Kh

(qh − 1)
[
]
(qd − 1)2
q̇d = rqd − (1 − τ ) FKd +
2η

K̇h =

1(

φ

ϕ )φ

Ch Lh

(51)

where ϕ represents the relative importance of leisure in utility
and 1/(1 − φ) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
labor-importing country’s production is expressed by the threeinput nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function

[

ρ

ρ

] ρρ1 ] ρ11

(46)

ρ2
Yh = Ah α1 Kh 1 + (1 − α1 ) α2 Nh 2 + (1 − α2 ) Nm

(47)

In the first stage native and migrant workers combine via a CES
aggregator to yield total labor, which is then combined with
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in the rich country is set at α1 = 0.15 to obtain a capital–
GDP ratio of 3.857, which is within the range for the data of the
Middle Eastern countries while that in the developing country is
set at θ = 0.15 to obtain a capital–GDP ratio of 1.982, which is
consistent with the data for the South Asian countries. Also, the
relative migrant labor intensity of 0.13 (α2 = 0.87) is chosen to
obtain a ratio of migrants to labor force equal to 16%, which is
within the range for the data of the South Asian countries. The
elasticity on leisure for the two economies, ϕ = σ = 1.75, is
standard (see Turnovsky, 2004) and would yield consistent labor
supplies for the two economies. The time allocation for the rich
country, Ñh = 0.382, is well documented in the real business
cycle literature (see Cooley, 1995) while the time allocation for
the developing country, Ñd = 0.367, is consistent with the time
use survey for India and Bangladesh (Narasimhan and Pandey,
1999; Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2013). For government
spending in the rich country, Gh = 0.9 is set to get a public
spending-GDP ratio of 24%, within the range consistent with the
data of the Middle Eastern countries while government spendingGDP ratio for the developing country is set at 30%, a plausible
faction for the South Asian countries. The parameters in the utility
of migrants (ζm = 0.2; δm = −0.7) are chosen to give a plausible
level of migrant consumption
( and as a result
) a plausible share of

capital to produce final output; −∞ < ρ1 , ρ2 < 1 and 1/(1 − ρ1 )
and 1/(1 − ρ2 ) are the CES between capital stock and labor, and
between native and migrant workers, respectively. In addition,
0 < α1 , α2 < 1 are the relative intensities of capital and
native labor, respectively. Ah is the level of technology of the rich,
labor-importing country.
The increasing borrowing cost faced by the residents of the
labor-importing country is given by4

(

rh = r + ω e
∗

)

B

a Yh
h

−1

(53)

where r ∗ is the world interest rate. ω is the weight on the
premium, and a parameterizes the rate at which the borrowing
premium increases with its debt position. In the case of a perfect
world capital market a = 0, the cost of borrowing reduces to r ∗ .
The developing, labor-exporting country’s utility functions for
domestic households and migrant workers are given by
U (Cd , Ld ) =

1 (

γ

Cd Lσd

)γ

1+1/δm

; M (Cm ) = ζm

Cm

1 + 1/δm

(54)

where σ represents the relative importance of leisure in domestic
households’ utility and 1/(1 − γ ) is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. ζm and δm are the weight and the elasticity of
migrant consumption in their utility.
The production function in the labor-exporting country is of
the CES form

[

ζ

ζ

Yd = Ad θ Kd + (1 − θ) Nd

] ζ1

remittances equal to 9.7%

(

Bd
b Y +κ
R
d

e

)
−1

which is well within

6

the range for the South Asian countries.
The world interest rate is set at 3.5% and the borrowing premium parameters are chosen to yield debt–GDP ratios that are
consistent with the data. In particular, for the benchmark calibration, the collateral parameter pertaining to remittances is set at
κ = 0. The time preference, β , is set at 5% which is plausible for
a developing country and with β > r ∗ this will ensure that the
economy is a net debtors in the equilibrium. The choice of ξ =
0.94 is equivalent to Mandelman and Zlate’s (2012) assumption
of 5-quarter income loss due to migration friction.
Another interesting thing to note is that given all the chosen
parameters, the model produces the natives’ real wage in the rich
country (w̃h = 7.448), that of migrant workers (w̃m = 2.591),
and that of workers in the developing country (w̃d = 2.436).
Thus, the native workers are more productive than migrant workers. The relative wage in the rich country to that in the developing
country is about 3 times, which is consistent with the data
ranging from 3 to 6 times (ILO, 2020). The difference between
the wage rates of migrants and domestic labor in the developing country is due to migration friction, so the workers of the
developing country are homogeneously less productive. At that
wage level in the developing country, the elasticity of wage is
0.133, which is below Mishra’s (2007) estimate of 0.4 for Mexican
emigration to the U.S. and Bouton et al.’s (2011) estimate of 0.32
in the case of Moldovans’ emigration. I will examine a higher
elasticity of wage in the following case for Nepal.

(55)

where −∞ < ζ < 1; 1/(1 − ζ ) is the CES between the stock of
capital and labor and 0 < θ < 1 is the relative intensity of capital
used in production. Ad is the level of technology of the developing
country. The interest rate faced by its residents is given by
r = r∗ + Ω

R̃/Ỹd = 0.097

(56)

where Ω is the weight on the premium, b is the rate of premium on borrowing, and κ parameterizes the extent to which
remittances may serve as collateral in determining the premium.
Table 1 presents the parameter values used for calibrating the
model and the steady-state values of the benchmark economies.
I choose six Middle Eastern countries to represent rich countries
which have imported a sizeable number of migrants from developing South Asian countries. The equilibrium dynamics are
linearized around the steady-state equilibrium described in Appendix B. The numerical simulations confirm the existence of a
saddle-point equilibrium, characterized by four stable (negative)
and four unstable (positive) eigenvalues, ensuring a unique stable
transitional path.
The parameter values are chosen in light of literature and the
data. The choice of φ = γ = −1.5 yields an intertemporal elasticity of 0.4, well within in the range of empirical evidence provided
by Guvenen (2006). For the production in the two economies,
ρ1 = 0.08 and ζ = −0.21 are to yield elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor equal to, 1.087 and 0.82, respectively,
for rich and developing countries (see Duffy and Papageorgiou,
2000). The choice of ρ2 = 0.5 is to get an elasticity of substitution
between migrants and natives equal to 2 (see Cortes, 2008).5 The
technology level of the rich country is set at Ah = 6 while that of
the developing country at Ad = 2.2. The relative capital intensity

5.1. Collateral effect of remittances
First, I examine the impact of remittances on the developing
country as they enter and relieve the borrowing constraint of the
recipient households. The case of full collateral effect (κ : 0 → 1)
is considered. The long-run result provided in Column (1) of Table 2 shows that remittances are expansionary for the developing
country. The country also borrows more from the international
market for investment. Domestic labor supply increases. As a

4 This functional form is a widely adopted and offers a convenient
representation of increasing borrowing costs for numerical simulations.
5 To my knowledge, there are no estimates for the elasticity of substitution

6 The choice of the adjustment cost parameters, h = 0.35 for the laborimporting country and η = 0.85 for the labor-exporting country, does not affect
the steady-state values because in the steady state investments in both countries
are zero and capital stocks are determined by the system of steady-state
equations (B.1)–(B.13).

between migrant and native workers in the Middle East. I resort to using Cortes’s
(2008) estimate for low-skilled immigrants and native workers in the U.S.
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Table 1
Parameter values and steady-state values of the benchmark economies.
A. Parameter values
Rich, labor-importing country
Utility
φ = −1.5; ϕ = 1.75; β = 0.05
Production
Ah = 6; α1 = 0.15; α2 = 0.87; ρ1 = 0.08; ρ2 = 0.5; h = 0.35; p = 1
Interest rate
a = 0.04; ω = 2
Government
Gh = 0.9
Developing, labor-exporting country
Utility
γ = −1.5; σ = 1.75; ζm = 0.2; δm = −0.7
Production
Ad = 2.2; θ = 0.15; ζ = −0.21; η = 0.85
Interest rate
b = 0.05; Ω = 1; κ = 0
Government
τ = 0.1; g = 0.3
Migration cost
ξ = 0.94
World interest rate
r ∗ = 0.035
B. Steady-state values of the benchmark economies
Variable

Description

Model

Data

Rich country
K̃h /Ỹh
C̃h /Ỹh
Gh /Ỹh
Ñh
B̃h /Ỹh
Developing
country
(
)

Data source

Capital–GDP ratio
Consumption-GDP ratio
Gov’t spending-GDP ratio
Native labor employment
External debt–GDP ratio

3.857
0.702
0.240
0.382
0.187

3.045
0.330
0.181
0.3
0.147

Ñm / 1 − L̃d

Ratio of migrant to labor force

0.161

0.106 [0.031–0.189]

World Bank

R̃/Ỹd
K̃d /Ỹd
C̃d /Ỹd
Ñd
B̃d /Ỹd

Remittance–GDP ratio
Capital–GDP ratio
Consumption-GDP ratio
Labor employment
External debt–GDP ratio

0.097
1.982
0.783
0.366
0.298

0.107 [0.032–0.273]
2.801 [1.827–3.193]
0.716 [0.576–0.809]

WDI
PWT 9.0
WDI

0.277 [0.203–0.517]

WDI

[1.813–3.927]
[0.182–0.414]
[0.111–0.235]

PWT 9.0
WDI
WDI
Cooley (1999)
GFD

[0.023–0.303]

Notes: The sample of the rich countries includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The sample
of the developing countries includes Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The data (means and cross-section ranges in
brackets) are between 2010 and 2017. Ratio of migrant to labor forces is calculated as migrant stock divided by total labor force.
Table 2
Long-run calibration results.
Variables

Rich country
Ñh
K̃h
Ỹh
C̃h
Developing
country
(
)

Description

Native labor employment
Capital stock
Output
Native consumption

Collateral effect of remittances

Policy to promote migration
ξ : 0.94 → 1

κ: 0 → 1

κ=0

κ=1

(1)

(2)

(3)

0
0
0
0

Change from steady state
−0.05%pts
−0.05%pts
+0.70%
+0.70%
+0.70%
+0.70%
+0.49%
+0.49%

Ñm / 1 − L̃d

Ratio of migrant to labor force

0

+2.25%pts

+2.25%pts

R̃/Ỹd
Ñd
K̃d
Ỹd
C̃d
C̃m
B̃d /Ỹd

Remittance–GDP ratio
Labor employment
Capital stock
Output
Consumption
Migrant consumption
External debt–GDP ratio

+0.01%pts
+0.04%pts
+0.11%
+0.11%
−0.07%
−0.25%
+2.91%pts

+2.71%pts
−1.13%pts
−3.09%
−3.09%
+0.26%
+0.94%
0

+2.70%pts
−1.12%pts
−3.06%
−3.06%
+0.25%
+0.88%
+0.81%pts

result, capital and output expand at the expense of its consumption. At the same time, migrant workers also squeeze their
consumption to send a little more remittances due to its positive
externality.7
This evidence seems consistent with Yang (2008) who shows
that households in the Philippines who receive remittances work
more hours in self-employment and are more likely to invest in
capital-intensive businesses. However, our result shows that this

effect is very small at the macro level. This could be because the
effect is more concentrated among remittance-receiving households without spillovers across the entire economy.
5.2. Policy to promote overseas migrant work
Now I examine the macroeconomic impact of the policy to
promote overseas migrant work. The government of the developing country reduces the migration friction for its workers by
signing memorandum of understanding with the rich country to
formally establish the recruitment markets and processes. South
Asian governments have since 1970s established public agencies
within the department of foreign affairs or labor to help with

7 Though not reported here, the dynamics show that consumption jumps
instantly with the decrease in borrowing cost. However, as the return to capital
is higher than the cost, capital rises with investment. Gradually, consumption
falls back to a new long-run value, lower than the pre-shock level.
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Fig. 2. Policy to promote overseas migrant work (ξ : 0.94 → 1; κ = 1). Note: – – – – – new steady state, - - - - - - - initial steady state.

these processes. The case of free labor mobility (ξ : 0 → 1) is
considered with no collateral effect (κ = 0) and full collateral
effect (κ = 1). The long-run results are given in Columns (2) and
(3) of Table 2, respectively. The policy to encourage migration
is contractionary for the developing, labor-exporting country. Its
capital and output fall by about 3% as a result of labor migration.
Consumption increases with remittances. Under the full collateral effect, the output impact of the policy is only marginally
different, showing that the impact of the loss of labor due to
migration outweighs the positive externality of remittances to
relieve the borrowing constraint. It is also interesting to note
that the rich, labor-importing country benefits from the policy. Its
output grows 0.7% although the native employment falls by 0.05
percentage points as a result of the inflow of migrant workers.
Fig. 2 shows the transitional dynamics of the two economies
in response to the policy under the full collateral effect of remittances. In the rich country, the influx of migrant workers due
to the policy instantly raises the demand for native workers due
to labor complementarity between native and migrant workers.
As a result, the real wage of the natives instantaneously jumps

up. However, the natives respond to the increase in wage by
cutting down their supply of labor. Although there is a reduction
in the supply of native labor, the influx of migrant workers fuels
economic growth in the rich country. Output instantaneously
jumps up and capital stock gradually rises. Consequently, native
labor tends to rise back slightly before starting to decline to a new
lower level in the long run as migrant workers continue to move
in. The output continues to rise with capital and consumption also
rises to a new higher long-run level.
In the developing country, labor shortage due to migration
impacted by the policy causes its domestic wage to jump up
instantly. In consequence, its output contracts instantaneously.
However, consumption jumps up with remittances. As migrant
workers continue to leave the country, reducing the return to
domestic private capital, private capital for its manufacturing
output starts to decline gradually. As a result, its output continues
to decline to a lower long-run level. The initial output contraction
has reduced its borrowing needs, so its debt position improves
in the short run. However, as remittances increase due to labor migration, reducing its borrowing risk, the country starts to
121

S. Lim

Mathematical Social Sciences 109 (2021) 113–125

Fig. 3. The case of Nepal (ξ : 0.94 → 1; κ = 1). Note: – – – – – new steady state, - - - - - - - initial steady state.

borrow again, though to a level lower than the pre-shock level.
Together with remittances, consumption only declines slightly
after its initial jump, and gradually to a new higher level in the
long run. The result for the long-run positive impact of remittances on consumption is consistent with empirical evidence in
the literature (see Lim and Simmons, 2015 for evidence in the
Caribbean and Donou-Adonsou and Lim, 2016 for evidence in
West Africa).8

less productive, compared to the average of the South Asian
sample. This is consistent with the data since Nepal is the poorest
among South Asian countries in the sample. Also, at that wage
level in Nepal, the elasticity of wage is 0.22, which is higher than
the South Asian sample. The results of the calibration exercises
for Nepal are presented in Table 3 and the transitional paths are
shown in Fig. 3.
In Column (1) of Table 3, the positive externality of remittances as collateral is larger for a country with larger share of
remittances. Its capital and output rise by 0.3% for Nepal with a
remittance–GDP ratio of 30% (compared to 0.1% in Table 2). The
country also takes on more debt due the positive externality of
remittances.
Columns (2) and (3) provide results for the impact of the policy
to promote overseas migrant work. First, without the collateral
impact of remittances, a poor country like Nepal suffers a significant loss due to labor migration. With a lower cost in getting jobs
for migrants, migrant workers to home labor force has increased
by over 4 percentage points. Its impact on domestic output is
even drastic. Domestic labor contracts by close to 2 percentage
points. Capital and output contract by 6.5%. With collateral impact of remittances, the contraction is a little smaller, at 6.4%,
even though remittance–GDP ratio increases by additional 6.8
percentage points. The contractionary impacts of the policy are
more pronounced for a poor country like Nepal because of a larger
elasticity of wage. At a very low wage, labor migration puts a
greater upward pressure on the domestic wage, thus hurting the
manufacturing sector of the country even more. At the same time,
the country also enjoys a greater increase in consumption due to
a large inflow of remittances.
The transitional paths provided in Fig. 3 are consistent with
those in Fig. 2.

5.3. The case of Nepal
However, one may suggest that the collateral impact of remittances may be large for a country with a large remittance–GDP
ratio, thus the policy to promote labor migration can be expansionary for the poor country. For example, the remittance flow
into Nepal accounted for more than 30% of its GDP in 2015
and 2016. So, in this section I modify a few parameters of the
labor-exporting, developing country to fit the data of Nepal and
re-examine the collateral effect of remittances and the policy to
encourage labor migration. The production technology is chosen
at Ad = 1.5, so that Nepal is poorer than the sample average. As a
result, Nepal exports more labor and receives more remittances.
The remittance–GDP ratio is now equal to 26%. Relative capital
intensity is set at 0.25 (θ = 0.25) to obtain capital–GDP ratio of
3.23. These ratios are consistent with the data of Nepal. In the
2010s, the data show that Nepal had an average remittance–GDP
ratio of 27% and an average capital–GDP ratio of 3.11. For the
benchmark economy, the collateral parameter, κ , is set at zero.
With these new parameters, the model produces the real
wage for native workers in the rich country (w̃h = 7.589), that
of migrant workers (w̃m = 2.009), and that of workers in the
developing country (w̃d = 1.888). The workers in Nepal are even

6. Robustness tests

8 Given the structure of the current model, FDI would also appear negatively
related to labor migration (see Lim, 2021, for this result). The decrease in the
return to capital stock due to labor leaving the country would put a downward
pressure on capital accumulation. However, as pointed out in Burchardi et al.
(2019) and Kugler and Rapoport (2007), there is also an information effect from
migrants to FDI. The increase in migrant workers helps reduce information
barriers for firms that are investing in the migrants’ country of origin. The
relationship deserves a careful examination; however, incorporating this effect
is beyond the scope of this paper.

According to KPMG Tax Database, in 2010s the corporate tax
rates for the South Asian countries range from 15% to 30%. Since
the paper focuses on remittances and capital accumulation for
small businesses, this capital income tax rate could be lower, so a
choice of 10% seems reasonable. However, one may contend that
small businesses in the poor countries operate in the informal
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Table 3
The case of Nepal.
Variables

Description

Collateral effect of remittances

Policy to promote migration
ξ : 0.94 → 1

κ: 0 → 1

κ=0

κ=1

(1)

(2)

(3)

Native labor employment
Capital stock
Output
Native consumption

0
0
0
0

Change from steady state
−0.06%pts
−0.06%pts
+0.92%
+0.92%
+0.92%
+0.92%
+0.64%
+0.64%

Ñm / 1 − L̃d

Ratio of migrant to labor force

0

+4.17%pts

R̃/Ỹd
Ñd
K̃d
Ỹd
C̃d
C̃m
B̃d /Ỹd

Remittance–GDP ratio
Labor employment
Capital stock
Output
Consumption
Migrant consumption
External debt–GDP ratio

−0.03%pts

+6.87%pts
−1.90%pts
−6.51%
−6.51%
+0.30%
+1.10%
0

Rich country
Ñh
K̃h
Ỹh
C̃h
Developing
country
(
)

+0.09%pts
+0.30%
+0.30%
−0.15%
−0.53%
+7.69%pts

+4.16%pts
+6.84%pts

−1.88%pts
−6.43%
−6.43%
+0.28%
+1.00%
+2.04%pts

Table 4
Robustness tests.
Variables

Rich country
Ñh
K̃h
Ỹh
C̃h
Developing
country
(
)

Description

Policy to promote migration
ξ : 0.94 → 1; κ = 1

τ =0

ζ = 0.08

(1)

(2)

Native labor employment
Capital stock
Output
Native consumption

Change from steady state
−0.05%pts
−0.04%pts
0.69%
+0.64%
0.69%
+0.64%
0.48%
+0.45%

Ñm / 1 − L̃d

Ratio of migrant to labor force

+2.18%pts

+1.94%pts

R̃/Ỹd
Ñd
K̃d
Ỹd
C̃d
C̃m
B̃d /Ỹd

Remittance–GDP ratio
Labor employment
Capital stock
Output
Consumption
Migrant consumption
External debt–GDP ratio

+2.60%pts
−1.09%pts
−2.96%
−2.96%
+0.24%
+0.87%
+0.77%pts

+2.01%pts
−0.90%pts
−2.47%
−2.479%
+0.14%
+0.49%
+0.60%pts

7. Conclusions

sector; thus, they are not subject to these formal taxes. Hence, a
robustness test is carried out for the policy to promote migration
as the tax on capital income is zero, τ = 0. The result is reported
in Column (1) of Table 4. The results do not change much. The
changes from the initial steady-state values for capital, labor
supply and output are only slightly smaller than those presented
in Table 2, possibly due to a slightly higher initial steady-state
values with τ = 0.
Another concern is the parameter, ζ , governing the substitutability between labor and capital in the developing country.
While the numerical calibration is done to fit the data in the recent years, ζ = −0.21 taken from Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000)
is obtained from data between 1960 and 1987. One may contend
that this parameter may be higher in the current economic environment and thus labor migration may affect the economy at a
lesser extent. I test this taking ζ = 0.08, which implies that the
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is 1.087, the
same as that in the rich country. The result reported in Column
(2) of Table 4 shows that the policy to promote migrant work
still has a negative impact on the output of the labor-exporting
economy albeit the magnitude is a little smaller due to a higher
substitutability of capital for labor.

In recent decades, several developing countries have adopted
the policy to promote overseas migrant work to deal with domestic unemployment pressure at home. This has allowed many
poor families to send members of their family to work as migrant
workers in richer countries. As a result, those migrant workers
can earn higher income and send back home remittances. In
this study, I employ a macro-dynamic model of two small open
economies – a rich, labor-importing country and a poor, laborexporting country – to examine the macroeconomic impacts of
this policy. The model employed in this study combines the
model used in Lim and Morshed (2017) and that used in Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2018). I extend the model used in Lim and
Morshed (2017) by introducing the collateral effect of remittances
in the borrowing constraint of the labor-exporting country. I also
relax the assumption of inelastic supply of capital in the rich
country by allowing capital to be converted from the traded
goods, but with an adjustment cost. Different from Chatterjee and
Turnovsky (2018), the model captures endogenous remittances
that are linked to the household’s decision to migrate.
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Appendix A. Solution to the equilibrium dynamics of the
model

The results from the calibration exercises show that remittances have a positive impact on the economy of the
developing country due to the collateral effect. Domestic households increase their supply of labor and domestic output increases with capital stock. This result is similar to that found
in Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2018). However, this effect is very
small. Thus, the policy to promote overseas migrant work benefits
the rich, labor-importing country at the expense of poor, laborexporting country. The loss of labor due to migration crowds
out capital in the manufacturing, traded sector of the developing
country. Because the crowding-out effect outweighs the expansionary effect from remittances, the policy to promote overseas
migrant work leads to a decline in the long-run economic development of the labor-exporting country. However, its welfare
improves as consumption increases with remittances. This result
is consistent with the empirical evidence in the literature that
remittances have helped reduce poverty in poor countries.
In addition, I examine the case of Nepal, the poorest country
among the South Asian countries in the sample. However, Nepal
received a very large share of remittances, equal to more than 30%
of its GDP in 2016. The results show that although the collateral
impact of remittances on the economy is larger due to a larger
share of remittances, the negative impact on its output due to
labor migration is even more pronounced. This is due to a larger
elasticity of wage. That is, the increase in labor migration as a
result of the policy has a larger upward pressure on domestic
wage, causing an even larger reduction in domestic labor demand.
As a result, capital stock declines significantly with the output.
In an era of industrialization, Lewis (1954) argues that new
industries can be created and old industries expanded without
any shortage of labor in countries with abundant cheap labor
that moved from agriculture into manufacturing. However, the
policy to promote overseas migrant work has diverted this labor
movement into the rich countries, boosting the economy of these
rich countries at the expense of industrial expansion of the poor
countries. The idea that the country can depend on remittances
from migrant workers for its development is a myth and the
policy is misleading.
The choice of the parameters produces the model economies
with native labor more productive than migrant workers. With
the assumption that migrant workers are complementary to native workers in the rich country’s production, the results from the
calibration are also interesting and seem consistent with some
observations, especially concerning the inflow of low-skilled migrant workers into the U.S. The inflow of migrant workers raises
the wage of the skilled native workers due to complementarity.
However, native workers supply less labor in the equilibrium as
the income effect from the wage increase outweighs the substitution effect. Given different skills of labor in certain host countries
like the U.S., this result should be further examined by properly
including the unskilled native workers as well.
It is also interesting to note that South Asian countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are exporting not only unskilled, but
also skilled labor to the Middle East. Although this study does not
differentiate the skill levels of migrant workers, one may believe
that the exports of skilled labor would dampen the economies’
manufacturing even more if the developing countries are producing highly-skilled-labor-intensive goods. Given different stages of
manufacturing development (i.e. from light to heavy industries
which require different skills of labor at a different stage) and
a possible effect of skilled emigration prospects (as discussed in
Beine et al., 2008), the issue of migrant skills deserves a more
careful investigation.

For convenience, I re-write the system of Eqs. (43)–(50) in a
general form as

λ̇ = Xλ (λ, Bd , π, Kh , Kd ) , Ḃd = XBd (λ, Bd , π, Kh , qd , Kd ) ,
π̇ = Xπ (λ, π, Bh , Kh , Kd ) , Ḃh = XBh (λ, π, Bh , qh , Kh , Kd ) ,
q̇h = Xqh (λ, π, Bh , qh , Kh , Kd ) , K̇h = XKh (qh , Kh ) ,
q̇d = Xqd (λ, Bd , π, Kh , qd , Kd ) , K̇d = XKd (qd , Kd ) .
The local equilibrium dynamics are obtained by linearizing
the
( system of differential) equations around the steady state
λ̃, B̃d , π̃, B̃h , q̃h , K̃h , q̃d , K̃d :
⎛ ∂ Xλ
⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ∂λ
⎜ ∂ XBd
λ̇
⎜
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ∂λ
⎜Ḃ ⎟ ⎜
⎜ d ⎟ ⎜ ∂ Xπ
⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ∂λ
⎜ π̇ ⎟ ⎜
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ∂X
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⎜Ḃ ⎟ ⎜
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⎜ ⎟ ⎜
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0

0

0
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0
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0

0
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(A.1)

Kd − K̃d

Using the functional forms and parameters described in
Section 5, the system of linearized equations (A.1) is characterized
by four stable (negative) and four unstable (positive) eigenvalues,
so that the equilibrium yields a unique stable saddle path. The
linearized stable solutions for λ, Bd , π , Bh , qd , Kd , qh , and Kh are
written in the following forms

λ (t ) = λ̃ + Z1 eµ1 t + Z2 eµ2 t + Z3 eµ3 t + Z4 eµ4 t
µ1 t

Bd (t ) = B̃d + v21 Z1 e

π (t ) = π̃ + v31 Z1 e

µ1 t

µ2 t

+ v22 Z2 e

+ v32 Z2 e

µ2 t

+ v23 Z3 e

+ v33 Z3 e

(A.2)

µ3 t

µ3 t

µ4 t

+ v24 Z4 e

+ v34 Z4 e

µ4 t

(A.3)
(A.4)

Bh (t ) = B̃h + v41 Z1 eµ1 t + v42 Z2 eµ2 t + v43 Z3 eµ3 t + v44 Z4 eµ4 t (A.5)
qh (t ) = q̃h + v51 Z1 eµ1 t + v52 Z2 eµ2 t + v53 Z3 eµ3 t + v54 Z4 eµ4 t (A.6)
Kh (t ) = K̃h + v61 Z1 eµ1 t + v62 Z2 eµ2 t + v63 Z3 eµ3 t + v64 Z4 eµ4 t (A.7)
qd (t ) = q̃d + v71 Z1 eµ1 t + v72 Z2 eµ2 t + v73 Z3 eµ3 t + v74 Z4 eµ4 t (A.8)
Kd (t ) = K̃d + v81 Z1 eµ1 t + v82 Z2 eµ2 t + v83 Z3 eµ3 t + v84 Z4 eµ4 t (A.9)
where µi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes the stable eigenvalues and the
vector (1 v2i v3i v4i v5i v6i v7i v8i ) is the normalized eigenvector associated with stable eigenvalues, µi , and the constants,
Zi , are obtained by imposing the given initial values on Bd , Bh ,
Kh , and Kd , Bd (0) = Bd,t =0 , Bh (0) = Bh,t =0 , Kh (0) = Kh,t =0 ,
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Kd (0) = Kd,t =0 . After obtaining the time paths as set out in (A2–
A9), the implied dynamics of the remaining variables can be easily
derived.
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Appendix B. Steady state
The steady-state equilibrium can be described by the following
set of equations.
B.1. Rich country

(
β =r +ω

)

B̃h

∗

f K̃h , Ñh , Ñm

(

(B.1)

)

[ (
)
(
) ]
β B̃h + C̃h + Gh = p fKh K̃h , Ñh , Ñm K̃h − fNh K̃h , Ñh , Ñm Ñh
(B.2)
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Ñh + L̃h = 1

(B.5)

B.2. Developing country
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(

)

(

)
(
) = ξ pfNm K̃h , Ñh , Ñm
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